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ABSTRACT 
This study expands upon literature on the cross-national causes of civil war and terrorism 
by combining the two concepts into an aggregate variable called internal armed conflict. It 
applies relative deprivation theory to politically excluded ethnic groups and also separates those 
two entities to examine socioeconomic desperation and ethnic exclusion respectively. From a 
review of the literature I identify eight variables that were found to be statistically significant 
predictors of either civil war or terrorism in previous studies and I use them as control variables 
in my models. I find that countries with excluded ethnic groups are somewhat more likely to 
experience internal armed conflict. Several control variables including ethnic fractionalization, 
log population, and percentage of years a country was under imperial or colonial rule were 
significant predictor variables across all the models. I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of the findings for extant and future literature and for policies that seek to reduce 
internal armed conflict.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 A common approach to the topics of terrorism or civil war is to examine the causes of 
either by conducting a large-N cross national study. This study follows that trend by testing 
relative deprivation theory as applied to politically excluded ethnic groups to examine if 
countries that have politically excluded ethnic groups- groups which are also socioeconomically 
desperate- are more prone to conflict. The application of relative deprivation theory to ethnicity 
is in line with studies, discussed in the literature review section below, by James Piazza and 
Alam Saleh. I also test socioeconomic desperation and ethnic exclusion separately. When the 
socioeconomic factors are not tied to excluded ethnic groups within a country they apply to the 
entire population of a country, but when they are combined with excluded ethnic groups they are 
meant to become relative measures.   
My study clarifies the dependent variable across many studies of this kind by using 
internal armed conflict as an aggregate of different forms of internal conflict such as terrorism or 
civil war. To operationalize ethnic power relations I use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 
dataset and its variable “excluded ethnic population” and to operationalize socioeconomic 
desperation I use GDP per capita and unemployment. The results show that as countries have 
increasing proportions of politically excluded ethnic groups they are more likely to experience 
internal armed conflict. Also, if countries have increasing ethnic fractionalization, population, 
and proportion of years under colonial or imperial rule, they are more likely to experience 
internal armed conflict. The empirical results of my study suggest that the prescribed policy for 
countries that want to reduce the likelihood that they will experience internal armed conflict is to 
generally enforce a more equitable distribution of political power among ethnic groups, 
particularly excluded ethnic groups. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The extant literature on the determinants of civil war and terrorism at a cross-national 
level may focus on different causes such as politics/governance, underdevelopment or general 
poverty, microeconomic factors such as unemployment or GDP per capita, or macroeconomic 
factors such as the level of economic openness of a country to outside trade. Many times authors 
combine two or more of these concepts in a simple analysis without adding too many variables, 
which would sacrifice elegance in a quantitative model. These all consider the country as the unit 
of analysis. Case studies are a rarity and are usually relegated to a select few examples such as 
Palestine (Berrebi 2007, Krueger and Maleckova 2003).  
 While the literature on the determinants of civil war or terrorism allows for a breadth of 
theoretically viable independent variables, the dependent variable is a key component to models 
that may drastically change the theory being tested. For example, some authors focus only on 
domestic terrorism while for others it is transnational or international terrorism. If the focus is on 
domestic terrorism, much of the time the theory is about marginalized minority groups within a 
country and this has a lot of theoretical cross-over with civil war literature. Those who focus on 
transnational issues may be trying to measure if a country is impacted by terrorists from other 
countries. Causes of transnationalism may emphasize the amorphous nature of franchises such as 
Al-Qaeda that transcend and seemingly disregard state boundaries. There is no clear consensus 
among scholars in this field about the definition of civil war or terrorism and so to some extent 
they are speaking past one another by using different operational definitions of the term.  
 As aforementioned, there is a lot of crossover between the civil war literature and the 
domestic terrorism literature. And depending on how a scholar defines terrorism, many tactics 
used by militants in civil wars may be categorized as terrorism. For that matter, the use of certain 
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tactics by insurgents or other domestic or home-grown armed groups may be deemed as civil war 
or terrorism. Authors including Nauro Campos and Martin Gassebner argue that terrorism differs 
from civil wars and other forms of internal violence because the main objective is to “maximize 
media exposure so as to further the atmosphere of fear.” 1 However, the two authors found that 
“civil wars and guerrilla warfare are robustly associated with various aspects of international 
terrorism” because they “provide for the honing of military, tactical, and organizational skills 
needed to carry out terrorist acts”.2 Conversely, Stathis Kalyvas argues that the logic of 
terrorism- the use of violence to induce compliance on the part of civilians- “informs the use of 
violence in civil wars in a fundamental way”.3 Thus terrorism and civil war, while they are two 
wholly separate concepts, may complement one other in functionally achieving the same end. 
Because of this, I do not differentiate between terrorism, civil war, and any other type of 
domestic violence in a country: I use the term internal armed conflict. In doing so I allow myself 
to relate theory from each one of the sub-groups of the aggregate such as civil war and use it for 
the concept. Doing so may sacrifice differentiation between the subcomponents of the concept, 
but to help compensate for potential varied results between terrorism and civil war I will include 
separate models of each to match my models of the aggregate. This study explores the 
relationship between the political exclusion and socioeconomic desperation of ethnic minority 
groups as two independent variables and internal armed conflict in a country as the dependent 
variable.  The following is a discussion of such theories that touch on aspects of this relationship. 
 
                                                          
1
Campos, N., & Gassebner, M. (2013). International Terrorism, Political Instability and the Escalation Effect. 
Economics & Politics, 25(1), 27-47. Retrieved October 30, 2015, from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12002/epdf, pp. 28 
2
 Ibid, pp. 43-44 
3
Kalyvas, S. (2004). The paradox of terrorism in civil war. The Journal of Ethics, 8(1), 97-138. Retrieved October 
30, 2015, from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:JOET.0000012254.69088.41, pp. 97 
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Government and Democracy 
 Academic discussions on political aspects as causes of terrorism many times frame the 
discussion based on a spectrum of democracy to non-democracy, focusing on factors such as 
political freedom, political participation, or civil liberties. As of a 2011 assessment 40 out of 43 
studies on this topic featured some measure of democracy.
4
 Such discussions sometimes lead to 
public policy conclusions that may support or undermine arguments for democratization as a 
foreign policy approach to help prevent non-democratic countries from engendering terrorists.  
 Alberto Abadie discusses the relationship between political freedom and terrorism. He 
uses Freedom House’s Political Rights Index to measure political freedom in a country via 
political rights, along with control variables such as linguistic, ethnic, and religious 
fractionalization and geography and climate.
5
 His study found that “political freedom has a non-
monotonic effect on terrorism”, meaning intermediate levels of political freedom make countries 
more predisposed to terrorism compared to “countries with high levels of political freedom or 
countries with highly authoritarian regimes”.6 A similar study by Basuchoudhary and Shughart 
measures, among other variables, the relationship between political freedom as measured by 
taking the average of Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties and transnational 
terrorism. They found that the “absence of political rights and civil liberties in a country has no 
impact on the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by citizens in that country”.7  A study by 
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen is similar to Abadie’s in that 
                                                          
4
 Gassebner, M., & Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, stock, and barrel: A comprehensive assessment of the determinants 
of terror. Public Choice,149(3-4), 235-261. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-011-9873-0, pp. 237 
5
 Abadie, A. (2005). Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.American Economic Review, 92(2), 50-
56. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859, pp. 4-5 
6
 Ibid, pp. 3 
7
 Basuchoudhary, A., & Shughart, W. (2010). On Ethnic Conflict and the Origins of Transnational Terrorism. 
Defense and Economics, 21(1), 65-87. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690902868343#.VP_eEvzF98E, pp. 76-77 
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they measure the effect of political rights and civil liberties separately on the “probabilities that a 
country will experience transnational terrorist attacks and that a given terrorist originates in a 
particular country,” respectively.8 Similar to Abadie, they also measure political freedom and 
civil liberties using the Freedom House’s indices.9 Their results show inverse significant 
relationships between political freedom and civil liberties and terrorism.
10
 
While Abadie’s and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al.’s analyses focus on political freedom as an 
independent variable, Quan Li uses other features of democracy including democratic 
participation under democratic systems because it allows citizens with grievances to “exert more 
influence on their own government so that they can seek favorable policy changes or 
compensation more successfully”.11 Another measure of democracy he uses is institutional 
constraints because, he argues, they prevent democracies from enacting strong antiterrorist 
strategies because of “institutional checks and balances.12 He used the POLITY IV dataset to 
measure democratic participation and found it to be a statistically significant variable with 
negative relation to the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a country. He also found 
government constraint, found in the POLITY IV database, to be positively correlated with 
transnational terrorist incidents.
13
 Closely related to Li’s two operational components of 
democracy is James Piazza’s concept of democracy, which is a function of two variables: the 
average of Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties and average polity scores as two 
                                                          
8
 Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Justesen, M., & Klemmensen, R. (2006). The political economy of freedom, democracy and 
transnational terrorism. Public Choice, 128(1-2), 289-315. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-006-9055-7, pp. 296 
9
 Ibid, pp. 300  
10
 Ibid, pp. 309 
11
 Li, Q. (2005). Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49(2), 278-297. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/49/2/278.short, pp. 281 
12
 Ibid, pp. 283 
13
 Ibid, pp. 285, 287 
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possible causes of terrorism originating in a country.
14
 His study found a positive relationship 
between democracy and terrorism: meaning that an increase in variables used to measure 
democracy was correlated with an increase in domestic terrorism.
15
 
There is far too much literature on this sub-topic to cover, but just based on an 
assessment of the articles above I glean that it is inconclusive as to whether variables used to 
measure democracy such as political rights, civil rights, or democratic participation actually 
reduce the incidences of domestic or transnational terrorism. This conclusion is unsatisfying and 
warrants further analysis of democracy as a possible cause of terrorism. 
 
Socioeconomic Desperation 
 Another major theme in the literature exploring determinants of terrorism is 
socioeconomic development factors such as GDP per capita, unemployment, and literacy rate. 
Usually the public policy or foreign policy implication for these studies is for wealthier Western 
states such as the United States or international bodies such as the United Nations to give 
development aid to ailing countries as a long-term preventative measure against terrorism or 
other armed conflict that may destabilize a country or region.   
 In addition to measuring political freedom as one of the primary independent variables, 
Abadie in the same study discussed above also measures poverty in the form of GDP per capita, 
or in other regressions he used the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), a “summary 
measure of human development”16 that includes GDP per capita as part of its aggregate along 
with life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, and the combined primary, secondary, and 
                                                          
14
 Piazza, J. (2008). Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us From Terrorism? International Politics, 45, 72-91. 
Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/095465590944578#.VP_o0PzF98E, 
pp. 78 
15
 Ibid, pp. 83 
16
 Human Development Index (HDI) http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
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tertiary gross school enrollment ration as possible reasons a country may experience terrorism.
17
 
He did not find a significant association between risk of terrorism and poverty.
18
 Kevin 
Goldstein built on Abadie’s study by updating his dataset and including unemployment rate as an 
additional economic measure.
19
 Similar to Abadie’s study, he used the World Market Research 
Centre’s Global Terrorism Index that measures terrorism risk for countries.20 He measured 
unemployment by country by using data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
ultimately found it to be a significant variable.
21
 Similar to Abadie, he found that GDP per capita 
was not a statistically significant variable.
22
 Perhaps this means that so long as people in a 
country are employed, no matter what their per capita income, they are less likely to become 
involved in terrorism. One possible problem he identified in the study is that of endogeneity or 
reverse causality for unemployment as a cause of terrorism because terrorism as an independent 
variable could have a “negative impact on economies and can disturb business, reduce growth, 
and very possibly as a consequence raise unemployment”.23  
Another study that incorporates unemployment as a cause of terrorism is Brian Burgoon’s 
that argues social welfare policies that aim to reduce “economic insecurity, inequality, poverty, 
and religious-political extremism” should reduce the likelihood a country will experience 
international or domestic terrorism.
24
 So theoretically this focuses on the country as a unit of 
analysis that may inadvertently cause terrorism because of its social spending (or lack thereof). 
                                                          
17
 Abadie, pp. 4-5 
18
 Ibid, pp. 9 
19
 Goldstein, K. B. (2005). Unemployment, inequality and terrorism: Another look at the relationship between 
economics and terrorism. Undergraduate Economic Review, 1(1), 6., pp. 4 
20
 Ibid, pp. 5 
21
 Ibid, pp. 7, 11 
22
 Ibid, pp. 15 
23
 Ibid, pp. 14 
24
 Burgoon, B. (2006). On Welfare and Terror Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of 
Terrorism. The Journal of Conflict Resolution,50(2), 176-203. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/50/2/176.short, pp. 176 
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His independent variable is a function of several measurements including total spending/revenue 
as a percentage of GDP, total transfers (social security and health spending) as a percentage of 
GDP, and total welfare spending (total social security and health, plus education spending) as a 
percentage of GDP that combines the other two variables with public spending on primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education.
25
 The results of the study showed a significant inverse 
relationship between a country’s total welfare spending and domestic/transnational terrorism by 
its citizens.
26
 
Another study that explores the relationship between poverty and terrorism is James 
Piazza’s in 2006 that measures poverty, inequality, and low economic development as possible 
causes of terrorism.
27
 The independent variables include HDI, Gini coefficient, unemployment, 
and calories per capita or average daily per capita supply of calories.
28
 He also measures a set of 
political variables including state repression, change in repression, and number of parties.
29
 He 
found that the poverty factors such as GDP per capita inclusive in HDI, unemployment, and food 
security did not significantly correlate with increased levels of terrorism. However the political 
factors as a second set of independent variables did prove to be significant.
30
  
From the studies discussed relating to socioeconomic factors and terrorism, I glean that 
GDP per capita has yet to be proven as a significant cause of. Unemployment has had mixed 
results, proving significant in Goldstein’s study but not Piazza’s, so this variable also needs 
further testing. Burgoon’s study lends support to the argument that social-welfare spending in a 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, pp. 187-188 
26
 Ibid, pp. 197 
27
 Piazza, J. (2006). Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages. Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 18(1), 159-177. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/095465590944578#.VP_o0PzF98E, pp. 159 
28
 Piazza 2006, pp. 165-166 
29
 Ibid, pp. 168 
30
 Ibid, pp. 170-171 
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country reduces terrorism while Piazza’s suggests that overall measures of poverty such as HDI 
do not.   
Ethnicity 
 A subset of the determinants of domestic terrorism literature focuses on ethnic minority 
groups within countries as the perpetrators. It also has a lot of cross over with civil war literature. 
One of the prominent theories that seek to explain domestic conflict on the part of ethnic groups 
is Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation theory describes “the tension that 
develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and 
this disposes men to violence…the intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly in terms of the 
average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities”.31 
Based on Gurr’s theory, Alam Saleh asserts that when a state discriminates against a certain 
ethnic group by enforcing economic inequality, marginalizing them politically, and denying 
them employment opportunities, it is likely to increase ethnic conflict.
32
 
 Another author that borrowed from Gurr was James Piazza in his 2011 study on the 
determinants of domestic terrorism. He hypothesizes that economic discrimination against 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) and low HDI in a country make it more likely to experience domestic 
terrorism.
33
 In doing so he introduces terrorism as a dependent variable to Gurr’s theory, since 
the relative deprivation model initially sought to explain ethnic rebellions, riots, and civil wars: 
not terrorism.
34
 His contribution to the theory is to add “two intervening factors in the 
                                                          
31
 Saleh, A. (2013). Relative Deprivation Theory, Nationalism, Ethnicity and Identity Conflicts. Geopolitics 
Quarterly, 8(4), 156-174. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://en.journals.sid.ir/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=287195, pp. 
165 
32
 Ibid, pp. 165 
33
 Piazza, J. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal of Peace and 
Research, 48(3), 339-353. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/48/3/339.short, pp. 339 
34
 Ibid, pp. 341 
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relationship between relative deprivation and political violence - group grievance and 
organizational opportunity….”35 His study found that economic discrimination against minorities 
was a significant predictor and that the “absence of and remediation of minority economic 
discrimination are significant negative predictors of domestic terrorism.
36
 Poverty measured via 
HDI was not a significant predictor variable and in fact “countries with higher levels of 
economic development experience more domestic terrorism than do poorer countries”.37 Atin 
Basuchoudhary and William Shughart II also wrote about ethnic conflict and terrorism, but they 
expanded their dependent variable to transnational terrorism. They measure the relationship 
between ethnic tensions in a country and transnational terrorism and theorize that “competition 
for access to economic resources or political power may trigger conflicts between different 
ethnic groups as they jockey for position.
38
 They found that ethnic tension is more likely to 
engender terrorism and that “economic freedoms lessen the tendency for ethnic tensions to 
spawn transnational terrorism over the entire sample”.39 
 In their examination of ethnicity and civil war, the oft-cited study by James Fearon and 
David Laitin seeks to explain whether ethnic or religious characteristics or conditional factors 
such as poverty make a country more likely to experience civil war.
40
 They hypothesize that 
ethnic or religious diversity is associated with a higher risk of civil war in a country.
41
 Their 
results showed that conditional factors such as poverty, a large population, and instability were 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, pp. 341 
36 Ibid, pp. 348 
37
 Ibid, pp. 348 
38
 Basuchoudhary and Shughart, pp. 65, 71 
39
 Ibid, pp. 85 
40
 Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 
75-90. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=142717&fileId=S0003055403000534, 
pp. 75 
41
 Ibid, pp. 78 
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statistically significant, unlike “ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as 
economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority 
religions or languages”.42 Another article about ethnicity and civil war is from Elaine Denny and 
Barbara Walter, who take a qualitative approach in arguing that ethnic groups, on average, are 
more likely to have grievances against their host state and “are likely to have an easier time 
organizing support and mobilizing a movement, and are more likely to face difficult-to-resolve 
bargaining problems”.43 They discuss the extant literature about ethnicity as a cause for civil war 
and go on to discuss their theory without actually testing it. One problem they identify is the lack 
of available data on the topic, but they acknowledge that emerging data such as the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) data set that measures ethnic group’s access to central power in a country as a 
good start because the “disaggregated data allows researchers to study civil wars at a group 
rather than country level”.44 In fact, the creators of the EPR, Andreas Wimmer, Brian Min, and 
Lars-Erik Cederman actually used their dataset to study ethnic diversity as a possible cause of 
armed conflict. They argue it is not mere ethnic diversity that engenders conflict; rather it is 
“certain ethnopolitical configurations of power” that make a state more likely to experience 
armed conflict.
45
 Their theory that “armed rebellions are more likely when the state excludes 
large sections of the population from central state power on the basis of their ethnic background” 
is consistent with the use of EPR data for the main independent variable since it measures 
minorities’ “degree of access to executive-level state power- from total control of the 
                                                          
42
 Ibid, pp. 88 
43
 Denny, E., & Walter, B. (2014). Ethnicity and Civil War. Journal of Peace and Research, 51(2), 199-212. 
Retrieved March 5, 2015, from http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/51/2/199.short, pp. 199 
44
 Ibid, pp. 208 
45
 Wimmer, A., Cederman, L., & Min, B. (2009). Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of 
a New Global Data Set. American Sociological Review, 74(2), 316-337. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/316.short, pp. 316 
12 
   
 
 
government to overt political discrimination and exclusion”.46 The results of their study support 
their hypothesis that the “likelihood of armed confrontation increases as the center of power 
becomes more ethnically segmented and as greater proportions of a state’s population are 
excluded from power because of their ethnic background”.47 
 From the discussion of literature that tests the relationship between ethnic discrimination 
and poverty and domestic terrorism, ethnic characteristics and civil war, and ethnopolitical 
configurations of power and armed conflict, the results are mixed. It is difficult to make a 
comparison among the three because of empirical and theoretic differences between the sub-
topics. One useful thing to glean from the discussion is the importance of a dataset such as EPR 
that measures armed conflict as an aggregate but still allows a researcher to disaggregate into a 
sub-category such as civil wars, as discussed by Denny and Walter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Ibid, pp. 317 
47
 Ibid, pp. 334 
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NEW THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
 The literature above informs my own theory about the relationship between ethnic power 
relations and socioeconomic desperation as causes of internal armed conflict. Saleh and Piazza 
did a good job of clarifying and expanding upon Gurr’s relative deprivation theory in their 
studies by applying the theory to ethnic or minority groups. I want to start where Piazza left off 
in his attempt to measure minority discrimination, but instead of measuring economic 
discrimination I want to measure the political exclusion of ethnic groups by using the EPR data 
set instead of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set. The former makes more sense theoretically 
because it measures relative political power, which directly taps into a relative measure of 
deprivation. Moreover, the unit of analysis for the EPR data set is ethnic groups within countries, 
whereas the unit of analysis for the MAR data set is minority groups specifically and this is not a 
relative measure among different ethnic groups within countries. Piazza includes HDI as a 
second variable in his study, which seems redundant because HDI is supposed to measure overall 
human development
48
 and he already includes an economic variable from the MAR data set in 
his model. Moreover, HDI does not represent relative deprivation theory effectively because it is 
partly a function of life expectancy at birth and adult literacy and these are not the most 
immediate needs of poor people: a poor person can be illiterate and still be content enough to not 
want to cause internal conflict. I concede that HDI may be a valid measure of relative 
desperation because if it is meant to be an overall measure of human development and some of 
these measures- notably life expectancy at birth- would cause people in a country to become 
desperate if they have low development relative to more affluent groups in the same country.
49
 
However, I argue that the most pressing factors that make people desperate in a country are 
                                                          
48
 Human Development Index (HDI) http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
49
 Ibid  
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economic and from economic prosperity follow measures of overall human development such as 
those measured in HDI.  Another problem with HDI is that it is an aggregate measure of three 
sub-factors and this makes it difficult or impossible to tease out the different components just by 
looking at the overall measure. If an excluded ethnic group in a country is found to be 
socioeconomically desperate, does that mean that group is predominantly suffering in the area of 
life expectancy, education, or GNI, or all of them equally?  In the results and analysis section I 
include each of the three models with HDI as the independent variable to measure 
socioeconomic desperation instead of GDP per capita and unemployment to see if the results are 
any different from that of the primary models tested. 
A variable that taps into relative deprivation theory is unemployment because excluded 
ethnic minority groups that lack opportunity for income to use as sustenance, let alone for social 
advancement, will be more likely to engage in internal armed conflict since, along with GDP per 
capita, these are the most immediate needs a group requires to survive. To reiterate the argument 
above, I view these purely economic factors are precursors to other possible measures of 
development such as HDI. Unemployment and GDP per capita as variables, when combined, tap 
into the concept of socioeconomic desperation, which is a slight modification of relative 
deprivation theory. If these two separate socioeconomic needs are not adequately met and the 
ethnic minority group also lacks political power relative to the center of power in the country to 
address its grievances, that country is more likely to experience internal armed conflict from the 
ethnic minority group. Thus my theory is a combination of ethnic exclusion from political power 
and relative deprivation theory as a possible cause of internal armed conflict. Also, I am 
separating socioeconomic desperation and ethnic exclusion and using proxy measures to assess 
their explanatory power against the same dependent variable, internal armed conflict. When I 
15 
   
 
 
separate the two theories, the result is that one model tests the effect of an asymmetrical political 
power dynamic in countries in terms of different ethnic groups, and the other tests the effect of 
overall country socioeconomic desperation factors. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 In this study I am building from previous research on the causes of terrorism and civil 
war by testing the effects of excluded ethnic groups and socioeconomic desperation factors 
against internal armed conflict. I hypothesize that countries that have a large proportion of its 
population that are excluded ethnic groups and also suffer from socioeconomic desperation 
pressures including low GDP per capita and high unemployment are more likely to experience 
internal armed conflict. I am testing three hypotheses, the first of which is: 
  
H1 Null: The proportion of politically excluded ethnic groups that also face increasing 
socioeconomic pressure has no effect on the likelihood of a country to experience internal armed 
conflict. 
H1 Alternative: Countries with increasing proportions of politically excluded ethnic groups that 
also face increasing socioeconomic pressure are more likely to experience internal armed 
conflict. 
 
  The key independent variable in the first hypothesis is an interaction of ethnic exclusion 
and the two socioeconomic desperation factors separately. Those two socioeconomic desperation 
factors in the model are GDP per capita and unemployment. Normally, these two variables are 
absolute country-wide measurements, but when I combine them with the excluded ethnic groups 
within countries I intend for them to become relative measures for those excluded ethnic groups 
relative to the rest of the population in any given country. The theoretical justification is that 
excluded ethnic groups that lack political power to address grievances and are also under the 
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pressure of socioeconomic factors are more likely to resort to armed conflict with a host country 
to restore socioeconomic contentment.  
The second set of hypotheses builds on the work by Fearon and Laitin in their article that 
concluded ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is not a significant determinant of civil wars and 
Piazza’s that concluded minority economic discrimination is not a cause of domestic terrorism. 
Instead of measuring fractionalization and economic discrimination for ethnic groups, I want to 
measure exclusion from power because if an ethnic group is politically disenfranchised in their 
host county relative to the center of power they may be more likely to take violent measures to 
express grievances. Ethnic fractionalization speaks more to the diversity in a country, not the 
relative power dynamic and if groups are marginalized.  
 
H2 Null: The proportion of ethnic groups that are excluded from political power has no effect on 
the likelihood of a country to experience internal armed conflict. 
H2 Alternative1: Countries with increasing proportions of ethnic groups that are excluded from 
power are more likely to experience internal armed conflict. 
H2 Alternative2: Countries with increasing proportions of ethnic groups that are excluded from 
power are less likely to experience internal armed conflict. 
 
 For the second set of hypotheses, I included separate alternative hypotheses for a one-
tailed test on either tail of the distribution. This is to say the exclusion of ethnic groups in a 
country may increase or decrease the likelihood that a country will experience internal armed 
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conflict. I am testing either possibility because, on the one hand, the excluded ethnic groups may 
feel so marginalized and disenfranchised that they are not willing to risk engaging in conflict. 
Contrariwise, the excluded ethnic groups may feel they can leverage enough support behind 
them to mount violence against their oppressors and the risk of being put down is worth fighting. 
So the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power may breed more or less conflict 
depending upon how marginalized and disenfranchised the groups are if the risk of conflict is 
worth the reward of potentially more political power. 
The third set of hypotheses focuses on socioeconomic variables and is heavily influenced 
by the relative deprivation theory conceived of by Gurr and expanded upon by Saleh and Piazza. 
The theoretical justification for measuring these variables including GDP per capita and 
unemployment is that if a population is generally unemployed and have a low income per capita 
they are under socioeconomic pressure and that pressure creates an urgency to act violently 
against a host state in order to reach a state of socioeconomic contentment. To clarify, the 
socioeconomic variables are not meant to measure overall development or rate of poverty. 
 
H3 Null: Socioeconomic pressures have no effect on the likelihood that a country will experience 
internal armed conflict. 
H3 Alternative: Countries that have increasing socioeconomic pressures are more likely to 
experience internal armed conflict. 
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VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENTS 
Dependent Variable 
 As I discussed in the theory section, I am aggregating subcategories of internal violence 
such as domestic terrorism and civil war into internal armed conflict. There are varying 
definitions of terrorism, civil war, and other types of conflict within countries and by using an 
aggregate of all of them it makes for less definitional disagreement over the meaning of the 
dependent variable. Also, as I discussed in the literature review, terrorism and civil war may 
complement each other. However, I decided to test the three models and corresponding 
hypotheses above with terrorism or civil war separately to see if the results between the two 
differ. These tests are discussed in the results and analysis section. I must clarify that I consider 
terrorism and civil war as the only two subsets of internal armed conflict. I collected data on 
terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database, which defines a terrorism incident based on a list 
of three criteria, which all must be met including: the incident must be intentional, the incident 
must entail some level violence of immediate threat of violence, and the perpetrators of the 
incidents must be sub-national actors.
50
 If in any given country and specific year there was 
internal armed conflict and it was not terrorism based on the definition above, it must have been 
civil war.  
 To measure the dependent variable I am using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset’s 
variable called “int” for intensity and modifying it to create my own categorical variable called 
“internal armed conflict”. In a given year if a country experiences internal armed conflict I will 
code it as a 1; if there was no internal armed conflict, I will code it as a 0, and this will allow me 
to estimate the likeliness that a country experiences internal armed conflict. To clarify, the 
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 Global Terrorism Database Codebook. (2015, June 1). Retrieved November 8, 2015, from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf  
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UCDP defines an “Armed Conflict” as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”.51 A possible limitation of this 
criterion is that there may be armed conflict that, while resulting in less than 25 battle-related 
deaths, is otherwise viable. This definition necessarily includes terrorism against the government 
of the state or civil war against the government of the state. I chose this measure because it is an 
effective means to encapsulate all forms of conflict within any given country, which include 
terrorism and civil war. That is not to diminish the significance of other forms of internal armed 
conflict, but it is the case that most of the literature focuses on terrorism and civil war. In order to 
narrow this down armed conflict to internal armed conflict, I am restricting the “type” of conflict 
variable within the dataset to only (3) internal armed conflict that occurs between the 
government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from 
other states.
52
  
  
Independent Variables 
 I am using the Ethnic Power Relations 3.0 dataset’s variable “exclpop”, which is a 
measure of the size of excluded population relative to total population, to measure the first 
independent variable.
53
 It makes more sense to measure the size of the population rather than the 
number of ethnic groups which are exploited because the size of the groups themselves may 
vary. The variable is a continuous measurement for a proportion out of a total of 1.00. A possible 
flaw of using this measurement is that it does not actually say anything about the degree of 
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 Wimmer, A., & Duhart, P. (2014, December 31). Ethnic Power Relations 3.01. Retrieved March 3, 2015, from 
http://www.epr.ucla.edu/ 
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exclusion; it only speaks to whether or not they (the ethnic groups) are excluded. Unfortunately, 
the EPR 3.0 dataset does not contain a measure capturing more precisely the level of exclusion 
faced by groups. As I will discuss in the next section about controls, I include ethnic 
fractionalization as a control to measure the ethnic diversity in a country. I am choosing the 
exclusion of ethnic groups rather than simply diversity because I want to get a measure of 
relative ethnic power dynamics in a country. Ethnic polarization, which is the “probability that 
two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups”54, also does not 
effectively measure the relative ethnic power dynamics in a country. 
 Two different measurements including GDP per capita and unemployment will be used 
as proxies for the socioeconomic desperation concept. I chose these two proxy variables because 
I theorize that people’s most basic needs are economic in nature and that other needs, such as 
indicators of development found in variables such as HDI, follow from economics. If citizens in 
a country are unable to make an income to purchase resources and are not employed, they will 
not be able to advance themselves in other ways such as healthcare or education. I applied a 
logarithmic transformation to both these variables after I observed that they had a skewed 
distribution in the original data. GDP per capita is a continuous variable that measures the 
standard of living in people in a country and it is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. 
Unemployment is a measure of the total (percent of the total labor force) that is “without work 
but available for and seeking employment” and is from the World Bank.55 A concern for these 
two variables is that they are measurements for an entire country and do not speak to relative 
measure between a “center of power” in a country and the less well off in relative or absolute 
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terms. Moreover, they are not measurements specifically for the ethnic groups identified within 
the EPR 3.0 dataset so empirically that may leave error for significant discrepancies. 
Theoretically these socioeconomic variables are measures of relative deprivation theory, but I 
cannot find such measures so the next best option is to use country-wide measurements of 
variables and use other tools such as a variable interaction between excluded ethnic groups and 
the two socioeconomic measures to make them relative measures and also control for other 
factors. 
Controls 
 I control for a range of variables that were used in the aforementioned literature and that 
are theoretically appropriate for my regression. A variable for government type and democracy is 
POLCOMP from the POLITY IV data which is an average of the regulation of participation 
PARREG and the competitiveness of participation PARCOMP measures democratic 
participation.
56
 I include this variable as a proxy for political participation and democracy in a 
country. These controls may be negatively correlated with the dependent variable because if 
members of a population lack representation, they are more likely to resort to violent means to 
make the government to change policy.  Socioeconomic factors to control for include measures 
of poverty or lack of development including the Human Development Index and Gini coefficient. 
I chose these two measures to control for overall development and income inequality in a 
country. Demographic variables include country population and ethnic fractionalization. I chose 
these measures to control for the size of population and also ethnic diversity in a country. 
Conditional variables within countries for which I am controlling include the percent of 
mountainous terrain in a country, whether or not there was a regime change within the past three 
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 Marshall, M., Gurr, T., & Jaggers, K. (2014, May 6). Polity IV Project. Retrieved April 3, 2015, from 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf. pp. 25-26, 29 
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years for a country, and the percent of years a country was under colonial or imperial rule from 
1816 to COW independence. I chose the percent of mountainous terrain in a country because 
such terrain may be conducive to asymmetrical warfare if an excluded ethnic group wants to 
launch violence against the government. I included regime change because transition from one 
regime to another may bring instability which may promote conflict. I included previous colonial 
or imperial rule because countries with this type of history may have had their form of 
government or distribution of power dictated by the colonial or imperial power and many times 
this creates an imbalance of power between ethnic groups which may foster conflict.  I applied a 
logarithmic transformation to the population variable after observing a skewed distribution in the 
original data and the percent of mountainous terrain in a country was already a logged variable in 
the original data I found. As aforementioned, by using panel regression for observations over a 
ten year span it allows me to control for time-specific irregularities that may deviate from the 
general trend of data. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Unit of Analysis 
 The unit of analysis of this study is country-year and I am using panel data for years 
2001-2010 for 150 countries. I am using country-year as the unit for analysis because 
theoretically I am trying to measure internal armed conflict within countries while controlling for 
factors outside of a state’s sovereignty. Other studies have focused on transnational terrorism, 
but they do necessarily not speak to the potential for factors within countries that may engender 
internal or “home grown” armed conflict. The reason I am using a panel of observations over a 
ten year range is because if I draw a sample from only one year it is not valid unless I am making 
a theoretical argument only that specific year. By analyzing ten years of data I will be able to 
observe trends over time and in a sense this is controlling for time because its allows me to see if 
there are significant outliers and either discard them or identify them as exceptional. Another 
possibility for the panel is to employ a time series method for the ten year span for each country. 
Doing so would facilitate analysis of each country over time in terms of its propensity for 
internal armed conflict and if the independent variables and possibly control variables serve as 
factors. Furthermore, such an analysis would possibly lead into a historical case study of 
prominent countries in the sample, examining the historical influences for the specific countries 
and how they reflect the time series data trends. 
 
Method 
 Since my dependent variable is dichotomous, I am going to use logistic regression with 
random effects to test my independent variables alongside the control variables against the 
dependent variable. I am running three separate models that correspond with the “hypotheses” 
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section above. The first model that tests H1 will include each independent variable and the 
interactions between excluded ethnic population and each of the two socioeconomic variables. 
The second model that tests H2 will include excluded ethnic population. The third model that 
tests H3 will include GDP per capita and unemployment. Each of the models will include all 
eight aforementioned control variables. 
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Below, in Table 1, I included the results for each of the three models. The variables are 
on the left margin, the label to distinguish each model and corresponding hypothesis is overhead, 
and at the cross sections are parameter estimates with p-values for corresponding z-scores in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 1. Study Statistics 
Internal Armed Conflict 
 
Number of Observations 
 
Wald Chi-square, P-value                    
Hypothesis 1, 
1089 
20.31 (0.085) 
Hypothesis 2 
1105 
20.13 (0.004) 
Hypothesis 3 
1089 
24.17 (0.004) 
Excluded Population 3.006 (0.536) 5.210 (0.050)**  
Log GDP Per Capita -1.684 (0.060)*  -0.910 (0.167) 
Log Unemployment -0.809 (0.400)  -1.202 (0.085)* 
Excluded Population and 
Log GDP Per Capita 
4.185 (0.109)   
Excluded Population and 
Log Unemployment 
-1.487 (0.588)   
Gini Coefficient -0.011 (0.830) -0.017 (0.712) -0.018 (0.722) 
Political Competition -0.003 (0.982) -0.057 (0.674) -0.034 (0.812) 
HDI 4.427 (0.215) 1.047 (0.706) 4.207 (0.239) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 7.443 (0.005)** 8.181 (0.001)** 7.922 (0.001)** 
Log Population 1.759 (0.000)*** 1.683 (0.000)*** 1.789 (0.000)*** 
Log Mountainous Terrain 0.735 (0.115) 0.628 (0.155) 0.925 (0.052)* 
27 
   
 
 
Regime Change in Past 3 
years 
0.099 (0.835) 0.122 (0.795) 0.049 (0.917) 
Percent of Years Under 
Colonial or Imperial Rule 
4.900 (0.032)** 4.016 (0.042)** 5.218 (0.019)** 
*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .0005; p values in parentheses 
  
 Based on these results I fail to reject the null hypothesis for H1, reject the null hypothesis 
and the second alternative hypothesis in favor of the first alternative hypothesis for H2 and fail to 
reject the null hypothesis for H3. For H1 none of the independent variables or their interactions 
were significant, in H2 excluded ethnic population was significant with a positive coefficient at a 
significance level of 0.05, and in H3 none of the independent variables were significant at a 
significance level of 0.05 but log unemployment was significant at a level of 0.10. However the 
convention for p-values is a 0.05 threshold so based on that I still fail to reject the null hypothesis 
for H3. Several control variables including ethnic fractionalization, log population, and percent 
of years under colonial or imperial rule were significant across all three models. Only models for 
H2 and H3 are significant overall as evidence by high Wald chi-square values with 
corresponding p-values under the alpha level of 0.05. The model for H3 is nearly significant 
based on the p-value of 0.085, which is only slightly above the alpha level. My only significant 
model for the independent variable of interest was H2 for excluded ethnic population, so for that 
variable I created a line graph with Lowess modification to smooth out the line. 
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Figure 1. Bivariate Lowess plot 
 
According to this graph, as the percent of excluded ethnic groups in a population of a 
country increases, so does the probability of that country experiencing internal armed conflict. It 
appears that the peak of this curve relationship is about 39 percent and this corresponds to almost 
a 25 percent probability that a country experiences internal armed conflict- after that point the 
curve slopes down and then levels off in a slightly positive relationship. 
For the primary models I included two principal component analyses with separate sets of 
variables based on two themes: socioeconomic variables and country conditional variables. The 
socioeconomic variables include Gini Coefficient, HDI, log GDP per capita, and log 
unemployment. For this battery of variables HDI and log GDP per capita explain the most 
variance, 63.14 percent and 62.69 percent respectively, in the first component which accounts for 
56.28 percent of the total variance. The second component has a high loading for log 
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unemployment at 94.23 percent of the variation. Thus the first component is based around GDP 
per capita and HDI and the second is based around unemployment. The first two components 
account for 81.58 percent of the total variance and the third component only adds 16.40 percent 
to the cumulative amount, so I decided to only keep the first two components. The country 
conditional variables mostly capture traits inherent in the country including political competition, 
log population, log percent of mountainous terrain, regime change within the page three years, 
and percent of years under colonial or imperial rule. For this battery of conditional variables log 
population and log percent of mountainous terrain explain the most variance, 61.11 percent and 
61.39 percent respectively, in the first component. Unlike the socioeconomic battery of variables, 
there is more of an even spread among the components in terms of the proportion of variance 
explained for the country conditional variables. The first component explains 28.21 percent of 
the variance, the second component explains 23.08 percent of the variance, and the third 
component explains 20.25 percent of the variance, and these three add cumulatively to 71.54 
percent of the variance explained. The fourth component adds only 15.16 percent to the 
cumulative variance explained and so I decided to retain only the first three components. The 
second component has a high loading for political competition at -81.03 percent of the variance 
and the third component have a high loading for regime change within the past three years at 
96.86 percent of the variance. Thus for this battery of variables, the first component has high 
loadings for population and mountainous terrain, the second component has a high loading for 
political competition, and the third component has a high loading for regime change. 
As for other variations of the models, I tested HDI as the independent variable for 
socioeconomic desperation and civil war and terrorism as the dependent variable, all in separate 
models. For the models with HDI as the independent variable for socioeconomic desperation, 
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there is no difference compared to the original models above in terms of which variables are 
significant based on the alpha level of 0.05. In the comparison of civil war and terrorism as two 
different dependent variables, there actually are some big differences in which variables were 
significant. For H1 with the civil war model variables including excluded population and 
political competition are significant while with the terrorism model variables including excluded 
population interacted with GDP per capita political competition, ethnic fractionalization, log 
population, percent of mountainous terrain, and percent of years under colonial or imperial rule 
were significant. For H2 with the civil war model variables including excluded population, 
political competition, and HDI are significant while with the terrorism model variables including 
excluded population, political competition, ethnic fractionalization, log population, percent of 
mountainous terrain, and percent of years under colonial or imperial rule are significant. For H3 
with the civil war model none of the variables were significant while with the terrorism model 
political competition, ethnic fractionalization, log population, percent of mountainous terrain, 
and percent of years under colonial or imperial rule are significant. Given the differences in the 
models between civil war and terrorism, it may be reasonable to treat them as separate concepts 
instead of aggregating the two into internal armed conflict. 
The implications of my hypotheses about aforementioned theories is that countries with 
ethnic groups that are excluded from political power are more likely to experience internal armed 
conflict, but if those ethnic groups also face relative deprivation from socioeconomic pressures 
they are not. Also, socioeconomic pressures such as low per capita income and unemployment 
alone are not significant predictors for whether or not a country experiences internal armed 
conflict. These results run contrary to Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation interacted with 
Andreas Wimmer, Brian Min and Lars-Erik Cederman’s theory of “ethnopolitical configurations 
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of power” because if an excluded ethnic group that is socioeconomically worse off than the rest 
of the population that does not necessarily mean the asymmetrical power dynamic will engender 
internal armed conflict. But the results do lend credence to Wimmer, Min and Cederman’s theory 
without the incorporation of relative socioeconomic variables. The results also, if only 
tangentially, reinforce Atin Basuchoudhary and William Shughart II’s theory that ethnic tension 
over “competition or access to economic resources or political power may trigger conflicts 
between different ethnic groups as they jockey for position” because ethnic power relations 
factor in political power.
57
 However, my results for the second hypothesis are inconsistent with 
James Fearon and David Laitin’s conclusion that ethnic fractionalization is not a significant 
predictor for civil war in a country; although they measured fractionalization and I measured 
exclusion. The former is a measure of diversity while the latter is a relative measure of the 
distribution of political power between two or more ethnic groups. An unexpected result was that 
ethnic fractionalization as a control variable in all three of my models proved to be significant 
and this also runs contrary to Fearon and Laitin’s study.  
 Hypothesis three was a test of theories about the relationship between socioeconomic 
development factors including GDP per capita and unemployment and internal armed conflict. 
The insignificant results for GDP per capita found in my study are consistent with Alberto 
Abadie and Kevin Goldstein’s conclusion that it is not a significant predictor for terrorism risk 
for a country. However, contrary to Goldstein’s finding that unemployment is a significant 
predictor variable, I found it to be insignificant in my model.  My model is also consistent with 
James Piazza’s study that found HDI (which includes GDP per capita) and unemployment do not 
significant correlate with increased levels of terrorism. The finding that population was 
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significant in all three models is consistent with Fearon and Laitin’s finding that it is a significant 
predictor of civil wars, but population is not necessarily a socioeconomic factor. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this study I tested the application of relative deprivation theory to excluded ethnic 
groups via proxy variables as causes for internal armed conflict. When I tested for each 
component separately using proxy variables I tested ethic exclusion and socioeconomic 
desperation as possible causes for internal armed conflict. I found that the second hypothesis 
which posits that countries with increasing amounts of ethnic groups excluded from power in a 
country are more likely to experience internal armed conflict proved significant. However my 
other two hypotheses that increasing amounts of excluded ethnic groups that are relatively 
socioeconomically worse off and increasing amounts of socioeconomic pressure in general for 
countries are more likely to endanger internal armed conflict proved insignificant. These results 
run contrary to many previous scholars’ results while reinforcing some others, and this indicates 
that further testing of the hypotheses discussed herein is needed. The implications of these results 
is that countries that want to decrease the potential for internal armed conflict in their country 
should try to be more inclusive of excluded ethnic groups and give them more political power in 
order to offset an asymmetrical power dynamic between ethnic groups. Attempting to improve 
socioeconomic conditions such as household income and employment may not be effective 
measures for reducing internal armed conflict. International bodies such as foreign donors, 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations may want to promote a more 
equitable distribution of political power among ethnic groups in conflict-ridden or conflict-prone 
countries rather than attempt to improve socioeconomic conditions if they wish to reduce internal 
armed conflict in those countries and should adjust their aid strategies accordingly. 
The implications for the significant control variables in each of the models may be less 
applicable to policy because there is not a lot a country or international body can do to affect a 
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country’s ethnic diversity, population, or imperial or colonial past. However, what a country may 
do is change their governing system to accommodate for an ethnically diverse population by 
sharing political power more equitably and guaranteeing minority ethnic groups political rights 
and representation such as veto power and seats in governing bodies such as parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
   
 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
Abadie, A. (2005). Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.American Economic 
Review, 92(2), 50-56. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859 
Basuchoudhary, A., & Shughart, W. (2010). On Ethnic Conflict and the Origins of Transnational 
Terrorism. Defense and Economics, 21(1), 65-87. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690902868343#.VP_eEvzF98E 
Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among 
Palestinians. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 13(1). 
Bhavnani, Ravi, and Dan Miodownik. "Ethnic Polarization, Ethnic Salience, and Civil War." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009): 30-49. Accessed October 30, 2015. 
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/53/1/30.full.pdf+html 
Burgoon, B. (2006). On Welfare and Terror Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic 
Roots of Terrorism. The Journal of Conflict Resolution,50(2), 176-203. Retrieved March 
7, 2015, from http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/50/2/176.short 
Campos, N., & Gassebner, M. (2013). International Terrorism, Political Instability and the 
Escalation Effect. Economics & Politics, 25(1), 27-47. Retrieved October 30, 2015, from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12002/epdf  
Denny, E., & Walter, B. (2014). Ethnicity and Civil War. Journal of Peace and Research, 51(2), 
199-212. Retrieved March 5, 2015, from http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/51/2/199.short 
Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day). (2014, December 31). Retrieved 
March 3, 2015, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.DFCT 
Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science 
Review, 97(1), 75-90. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=142717&fil
eId=S0003055403000534 
Gassebner, M., & Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, stock, and barrel: A comprehensive assessment 
of the determinants of terror. Public Choice,149(3-4), 235-261. Retrieved March 7, 2015, 
from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-011-9873-0 
Global Terrorism Database Codebook. (2015, June 1). Retrieved November 8, 2015, from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf  
Goldstein, K. B. (2005). Unemployment, inequality and terrorism: Another look at the 
relationship between economics and terrorism. Undergraduate Economic Review, 1(1), 6. 
Human Development Index (HDI) http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
Kalyvas, S. (2004). The paradox of terrorism in civil war. The Journal of Ethics, 8(1), 97-138. 
Retrieved October 30, 2015, from 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:JOET.0000012254.69088.41 
36 
   
 
 
Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal 
connection?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119-144. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Justesen, M., & Klemmensen, R. (2006). The political economy of 
freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism. Public Choice, 128(1-2), 289-315. 
Retrieved March 7, 2015, from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-006-
9055-7 
Li, Q. (2005). Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), 278-297. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/49/2/278.short 
Marshall, M., Gurr, T., & Jaggers, K. (2014, May 6). Polity IV Project. Retrieved April 3, 2015, 
from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf 
Piazza, J. (2006). Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1), 159-177. Retrieved March 7, 2015, 
from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/095465590944578#.VP_o0PzF98E 
Piazza, J. (2008). Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us From Terrorism? International 
Politics, 45, 72-91. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/095465590944578#.VP_o0PzF98E 
Piazza, J. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal of 
Peace and Research, 48(3), 339-353. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/48/3/339.short 
Saleh, A. (2013). Relative Deprivation Theory, Nationalism, Ethnicity and Identity 
Conflicts. Geopolitics Quarterly, 8(4), 156-174. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://en.journals.sid.ir/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=287195 
Themnér, L. (2014, January 1). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook. Retrieved 
March 3, 2015, from 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/124/124920_1codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-conflict-
dataset-v4_2014a.pdf 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate). (2014, December 31). 
Retrieved March 3, 2015, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS 
Wimmer, A., & Duhart, P. (2014, December 31). Ethnic Power Relations 3.01. Retrieved March 
3, 2015, from http://www.epr.ucla.edu/ 
Wimmer, A., Cederman, L., & Min, B. (2009). Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A 
Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set. American Sociological 
Review, 74(2), 316-337. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from 
http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/316.short 
 
 
37 
   
 
 
APPENDIX A. DATA SUMMARIES 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 
         pci        1497    .4707928    .2863683          0          1
     regchg3        1497    .0761523    .2653303          0          1
      lmtest        1497     2.15672    1.411774          0   4.421247
lnPopulation        1453    16.37626    1.375348   13.33239   21.01422
                                                                      
     ethfrac        1497    .4079067    .2793435       .001   .9250348
         HDI        1430    .6798357    .1830645       .273       .971
polcompPol~V        1415    6.999293    3.023131          1         10
GiniCoeffi~t        1184    38.45558    8.702764   19.78291   68.90324
x1exclpop~mp        1472    .2506999    .3826445  -.4290935   2.338529
                                                                      
x1exclpop~ap        1473    .1651549    .3098249  -1.061037   1.434147
  lnx22unemp        1473    1.943541    .7093689  -1.609438   4.706824
lnx21gdppcap        1474    1.570973    1.338859  -1.705173   4.187819
   x1exclpop        1496    .1381763    .1890158          0        .85
       y1iac        1497    .1289245    .3352284          0          1
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
38 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2. H1 Residuals 
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Figure 3. H2 Residuals 
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Figure 4. H3 Residuals 
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APPENDIX B. RAW TEST RESULTS 
Table 3. H1 Results 
 Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =   244.37 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
                                                                                        
                   rho     .8612153   .0473424                      .7406008     .930974
               sigma_u     4.518293   .8948313                      3.064764    6.661188
                                                                                        
              /lnsig2u     3.016268   .3960926                      2.239941    3.792596
                                                                                        
                 _cons    -42.88277   9.801776    -4.37   0.000    -62.09389   -23.67164
                   pci     4.897016   2.279619     2.15   0.032      .429045    9.364987
               regchg3     .0988536   .4736272     0.21   0.835    -.8294387    1.027146
                lmtest     .7352234   .4664444     1.58   0.115    -.1789909    1.649438
          lnPopulation     1.759171   .4730693     3.72   0.000     .8319721     2.68637
               ethfrac      7.44301    2.66763     2.79   0.005     2.214551    12.67147
                   HDI     4.426526   3.572557     1.24   0.215    -2.575556    11.42861
       polcompPolityIV    -.0032794   .1435713    -0.02   0.982     -.284674    .2781153
       GiniCoefficient    -.0108485   .0504228    -0.22   0.830    -.1096754    .0879784
  x1exclpop_lnx22unemp    -1.487097   2.745563    -0.54   0.588    -6.868302    3.894107
x1exclpop_lnx21gdppcap     4.185243   2.612278     1.60   0.109    -.9347277    9.305214
            lnx22unemp    -.8089668   .9620328    -0.84   0.400    -2.694517    1.076583
          lnx21gdppcap     -1.68375   .8941133    -1.88   0.060     -3.43618      .06868
             x1exclpop     3.006337   4.852695     0.62   0.536    -6.504771    12.51744
                                                                                        
                 y1iac        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                        
Log likelihood  = -175.22108                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0854
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =     20.41
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12
                                                               max =        10
                                                               avg =       8.5
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =       128
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1089
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Table 4. H2 Results 
 Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =   257.03 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
                                                                                 
            rho     .8503287   .0432324                      .7448629    .9170531
        sigma_u     4.323281   .7342902                      3.099136    6.030958
                                                                                 
       /lnsig2u     2.928029   .3396912                      2.262247    3.593812
                                                                                 
          _cons    -41.87617    9.18875    -4.56   0.000    -59.88579   -23.86656
            pci     4.016066   1.979137     2.03   0.042     .1370283    7.895104
        regchg3     .1219394    .470112     0.26   0.795    -.7994632    1.043342
         lmtest      .627633    .441489     1.42   0.155    -.2376695    1.492936
   lnPopulation     1.682762   .4458567     3.77   0.000     .8088993    2.556626
        ethfrac      8.18144   2.575835     3.18   0.001     3.132896    13.22998
            HDI     1.046992    2.77655     0.38   0.706    -4.394947     6.48893
polcompPolityIV    -.0566776   .1347248    -0.42   0.674    -.3207334    .2073782
GiniCoefficient    -.0170782   .0462034    -0.37   0.712    -.1076351    .0734787
      x1exclpop     5.210412   2.656448     1.96   0.050     .0038702    10.41695
                                                                                 
          y1iac        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
Log likelihood  = -178.67761                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0040
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =     24.17
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12
                                                               max =        10
                                                               avg =       8.5
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =       130
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1105
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Table 5. H3 Results 
 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =   270.84 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
                                                                                 
            rho     .8804221   .0341014                      .7960152    .9328487
        sigma_u     4.921633   .7970945                      3.583034    6.760325
                                                                                 
       /lnsig2u     3.187281   .3239146                       2.55242    3.822142
                                                                                 
          _cons     -43.1434   9.202566    -4.69   0.000     -61.1801   -25.10671
            pci     5.218455   2.228466     2.34   0.019     .8507428    9.586167
        regchg3     .0492639   .4748171     0.10   0.917    -.8813605    .9798883
         lmtest     .9253072   .4760673     1.94   0.052    -.0077675    1.858382
   lnPopulation     1.788712   .4609702     3.88   0.000     .8852269    2.692197
        ethfrac     7.922482   2.423137     3.27   0.001     3.173222    12.67174
            HDI     4.206968   3.575611     1.18   0.239      -2.8011    11.21504
polcompPolityIV    -.0340678   .1434965    -0.24   0.812    -.3153158    .2471803
GiniCoefficient    -.0176555   .0495392    -0.36   0.722    -.1147506    .0794396
     lnx22unemp    -1.202374   .6983092    -1.72   0.085    -2.571035    .1662872
   lnx21gdppcap    -.9095761   .6575116    -1.38   0.167    -2.198275    .3791228
                                                                                 
          y1iac        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
Log likelihood  =  -177.5455                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0036
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =     26.13
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12
                                                               max =        10
                                                               avg =       8.5
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =       128
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1089
